Brasil receberá mais veículos Piranha

Esses ai já são nossos e aquilo é um lançador de granadas ? Ontem estava na estrada perto de Barbacena e vi duas carretas paradas com dois AAVP7 pelados indo pra Brasília!

A marinha não já havia comprado 12?São quantos agora?

Apesar de continuar achando que poderíamos, sim!, repotenciar e modernizar os Urutu, parabéns para a MB que continua comprando independentemente de ‘FX’s. Não sei porque o Brigadeiro não vai conversar com o Almirante para aprender como ‘se faz as coisas’.

Vader, posso estar enganado, até porquê não estou por dentro desse assunto, mas acho que a compra do Piranha IIIC para o CFN foi feita antes da centralização das compras pelo ministério da defesa.

Já no caso do EB, eles estão usando o Urutu no haiti. Creio que na visão do CFN, o Urutu não é apropriado para uso naquele país, por isso eles compraram os Piranha.

Discordo do amigo em relação a uma suposta preferência do governo federal para com a MB.

Abs.

Caros amigos, concordo com o Gilberto. O EB e a FAB parecem realmente não terem se adaptado a proposta do atual governo e que muito provavelmente vai continuar no proximo, tem-se que se aproveitar as oportunidades dadas afinal cavalo dado não se olha os dentes. Quanto a essa coisa de os caças franceses terem a hora de voo muito cara pode até ser, mais claro que se realmente fosse necessário uma atuação da força aerea com certeza não falta combustivel e nem dinheiro no governo. Quando ao exercito poderia logo ter absorvido a ideia e se associado por ex a avibras desde o inicio da END para compra novos sistemas Astro II e desenvolver o MT-300. mais quem sabe ainda ha tempo!!

Na verdade, me perece que a Marinha sabiamente se antecipou e em vez de esperar por um produto que sabe-se lá se cumpriria as sua especificações (Urutu III), resolveu agir e comprou o que precisava. Mesma coisa com o Seahawk. Comprou pra não ser entubada com o Ec725 mal adaptado. Pelo menos compra o que precisa pra operar, parabéns ao CFN.

EB + Leopard = Gatinho de Pijama.

Parabéns MB!!!!!!!!!

Eu não consigo entender como alguém considera que esta rivalidade infantil entre as forças pode ser benéfica ao BRASIL. E o pior é que tem gente que fomenta este tipo de abordagem improdutiva e contrária ao BRASIL em espaços onde a discussão poderia ser mais séria. Se a MB ou o CFN estão melhorando seus meios, o BRASIL ganha com isso. O que eu vejo é que balela é não encarar os fatos que se apresentam e ficar criticando meramente por raiva ideológica do governo. Os fatos: O EB tem o Urutu operacional. Não se produz mais o Urutu. O CFN precisa de blindados sobre rodas para atuar no Haiti, por esta razão, pra ontem (não sei pq mencionaram o M113 do EB, sobre lagartas). O que o CFN faz? 1) Espera por prazo indeterminado o URUTU III e, enquanto isto, os fuzileiros andam a pé ou em veículos sem blindagem no Haiti? 2) Compra o Piranha, do qual já possui algumas unidades, para complementar a insuficiente quantidade em inventário?

Olha esse link, fala tudo sobre os piranha III da marinha :
http://www.mowag.ch/En/04E_News/2008/20081120E.htm

Esse lança granadas acho que é um espanhol de 40mm não é isso, alguem saberia me dizer se o EB possui algo parecido?

Marco Antonio disse:
1 de setembro de 2010 às 11:39

“(não sei pq mencionaram o M113 do EB, sobre lagartas)”

Prezado Marco Antônio, eu mencionei o M-113 porque ele a princípio não será substituído por um veículo sobre lagartas, mas sim pelo mesmo Urutu-III que serviria perfeitamente à missão do CFN.

E pro colega que falou que a compra talvez tenha sido anterior à fusão no MD: a END já existe faz algum tempo, e mesmo assim a aquisição só foi anunciada agora. Oras, vai falar que a Marinha não sabia que existia a END e a VBTP da Iveco? Conversa fiada parceiro…

Outra coisa: não estou criticando o CFN, que evidentemente opera com o que se-lhe dão. Nem tampouco o armamento em si, que já se provou ser excelente.

O que critico é o governo pregar uma coisa diante dos holofotes da “mídia” e, fora deles, fazer uma coisa completamente diferente. É o governo pregar uma coisa (padronização, valorização do produto nacional, etc) quando lhe interessa, encurtando as rédeas do EB e da FAB, por exemplo, e quando não interessa deixar a MB fazer o que ela bem entender.

Enfim, critico a dicotomia de se ter uma Marinha do Brasil eternamente (a décadas) gastona e esbanjadora (conquanto igualmente ineficaz e defasada) e um Exército que incorporou a menor quantidade de recrutas desde o término da Segunda Guerra Mundial.

As Forças Armadas são como um organismo, composto de órgãos: se um não funciona, o corpo todo padece. A Marinha não ganhará uma guerra sozinha, sem o apoio da FAB e do EB, por melhor que seja sua aviação naval e sua força combatente.

E tem mais: ninguém mora no mar! Salvo raríssimas exceções, a imensa maioria do povo brasileiro vive continente adentro! Nenhuma Força deveria ser privilegiada num país minimamente preocupado com sua defesa, mas se alguma FA devesse ser privilegiada no Brasil seria o Exército Brasileiro! O mesmo que sempre salvou a nação de suas ameaças quando tudo o mais falhou miseravelmente!

De maneira que é ininteligível, a não ser se se pensar em politicagem rastaquera, o porque de o governo permitir apenas à MB contrariar a END que ele mesmo editou.

Ou essa porcaria de END vale para todas as Forças, ou não vale para ninguém.

Tá mais do que na hora de parar com essa história de “a mão direita não enxergar o que a esquerda faz”. Não é questão de rivalidade coisa alguma: é questão de lógica, quando não simplesmente de justiça com os militares que trabalham nas demais Forças (FAB e EB).

Sds.

KDU disse:
2 de setembro de 2010 às 14:29

Olha, acho importante ter forças de elite. Por isso mencionei as de operações especiais.

Quanto a comparar com o que os EUA fazem, isso é natural. Desde a 2ª Guerra Mundial a Marinha, e os Fuzileiros Navais, se organizam, equipam, treinam e operam com base no que a US Navy e os US Marines fazem (evidentemente com muitos degraus abaixo em termos de nível tecnológico e operacionalidade). Nós não desenvolvemos doutrina, usamos a dos americanos. Se eles mudarem a doutrina de organização e uso dos Marines, também faremos isso. Senão ficaremos sendo a única marinha do mundo a achar que deve estar preparada para fazer um desembarque anfíbio como em Okinawa, Iwo Jima etc.

Pensando bem, se isso ocorrer a Marinha não estará em patamar muito diferente da FAB, que até hoje pratica bombardeio como fazia na Itália há 70 anos atrás com os P-47 (é brochante ver os F-5 nas comemorações do dia da Aviação de Caça fazendo bombardeio de mergulho. parece que o tempo não passou).

Todos estes comentários me fizeram lembrar uma nota sobre os Fuzileiros Navais estadunidenses que li em 15 Agosto, e que achando muito oportuna, resolvi postar aqui.

Bacchi

Shrinking the USMC – August 15, 2010
The U.S. Marine Corps is again threatened, this time with a sharp reduction in its size. In response, marine commanders say they would prefer to be a smaller force, one that concentrates on its main mission; amphibious operations. The marines were unhappy with the way they have been used as an army auxiliary over the past decade. The marines consider themselves specialists, while the army are generalists (and, for example, carried out more amphibious operations than the marines did during World War II). But by law (which specifies the minimum size of the Corps, a law that could be changed) and determination (of generations of marines), the marines have come to comprise a quarter of America’s ground combat forces. That’s active duty, when you count the much larger army reserve force, the marines are 18 percent of ground combat forces. The marines never wanted to be just another part of American ground combat forces.
The marines are also concerned with their relationship with the U.S. Navy, which has now formed another ground combat force. To understand how this came about, you have to understand the relationship between the navy and the marines. The marines are not part of the navy, as they are often described. Both the navy and marines are part of the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force each have only one component.
Over the years, the marines have acquired more and more autonomy from the navy. When the U.S. Marine Corps was created, over two centuries ago, marines were sailors trained and equipped to fight as infantry, and they were very much part of the navy, and part of ship crews. This changed radically in the late 19th century, when all-metal steam ships replaced wooden sailing ships. The new “iron ships” really didn’t need marines, and there were proposals to eliminate them. In response, the American marines got organized and made themselves useful in other ways. For example, the marines performed very well as “State Department Troops” in Latin America for half a century (late 19th century to just before World War II), where American troops were frequently used to deal with civil disorder abroad, and nation building. During World War I (1914-18), they provided a brigade for ground combat in Europe, where they demonstrated exceptional combat skills.
During the 1930s, as World War II approached, the U.S. Marine Corps really ran with the ball when the navy realized they would have to use amphibious assaults to take heavily fortified Japanese islands in any future war. Thus, once the U.S. entered World War II, the marines formed their first division size units, and ended the war with six divisions, organized into two corps.
The Marine Corps was no longer just a minor part of the navy, but on its way to being a fourth service. Over the next half century, it basically achieved that goal. But in doing that, the navy lost control of its ground troops. Navy amphibious ships still went to sea, with battalions of marines on board. But because the marines are mainly an infantry force, and the war on terror is basically an infantry scale battle, the marines spent a lot more time working alongside the U.S. Army.
Thus, over the last five years, the new U.S. Navy has built a new ground combat force, staffed by 40,000 sailors. This is NECC (Navy Expeditionary Combat Command), which is capable of operating along the coast and up rivers, as well as further inland. NECC units have served in Iraq, and are ready to deploy anywhere else they are needed. The 1,200 sailors in the EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams are particularly sought after, because of increased use of roadside bombs and booby traps by the enemy. NECC has also organized three Riverine Squadrons, and these served in Iraq. NECC basically consists of most of the combat support units the navy has traditionally put ashore, plus some coastal and river patrol units that have usually only been organized in wartime.
This new navy organization, and the strategy goes with it, still comes as a surprise to many people, especially many of those in Congress who were asked to pay for it. It came as a surprise to many NECC sailors as well. The navy even called on the marines to provide infantry instructors for the few thousand sailors assigned to riverine (armed patrol boat) units. The navy already had infantry training courses for Seabees (naval construction personnel) and members of EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams. Now it’s combining all that in the new Expeditionary Combat Skills (ECS) course, which will be conducted at a base in Mississippi.
With the marines appropriated by the army for land combat, the navy still wanted and needed land forces. So the navy has created NECC. The navy still considers the marines its primary “infantry force”, but the NECC will contain sailors trained and equipped for land operations the navy believes it should be involved in. Some of these are still on the water, like “riverine operations” (small gunboats and troop carriers to control rivers and coastal waters against irregulars), and “naval infantry” to defend navy land bases in hostile territory.
The U.S. Marine Corps has mixed feelings about NECC, for the marines have long been the navy’s ground combat troops. The navy says that the USMC mission will remain. Thus the marines want to shrink so they become small enough to handle anticipated navy amphibious operations, and not large enough to have troops available for large scale support of army operations.
In effect, the American marines want to be more like the British marines. That’s interesting, because British marines are called Royal Marine Commandos, and are quite different. Britain, which invented the modern concept of the commando, disbanded it’s ten army commando’s (as the battalion size commando units were called) at the end of World War II. The Royal Marines, however, saw the commando concepts as a welcome addition to their own amphibious doctrine and retained three of their nine Royal Marine Commandos. Since World War II, the Royal Marines have maintained at least three commando battalions. Artillery and engineer units are supplied by the army.
Like the U.S. Marines, the Royal Marines realized that assault from the sea was always a commando like operation, requiring special training, bold leadership and an aggressive spirit. The Royal Marines, like their American counterparts, continued to innovate. In 1956, it was a Royal Marine Commando that launched the first helicopter assault from ships against a land target (during the invasion of Egypt). The Royal Marine Commandos were used extensively to keep the peace in Ireland during the 1970s and 80s. In 1982, it was two Royal Marine Commandos and one parachute battalion that did most of the fighting to retake the Falkland Islands from Argentina. The Royal Marines have performed peacekeeping duty in the Balkans and Africa, and served as an amphibious fast reaction force.
While the U.S. Marines made a name for themselves with multi-division amphibious operations in the Pacific during World War II, the Royal Marines stuck with the commando type operations that characterize what marines spend most of the time doing between major wars. Remember, the last large scale amphibious operation took place sixty years ago (Inchon, Korea in 1950). Since then, the typical marine mission has been a quick assault using a small (usually battalion size) force.
In anticipation of this, the U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was created over the last few years. In that time, it has sent some of its 2,400 personnel on over thirty deployments (in South America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia). MARSOC is organized into a headquarters, a two battalion Special Operations Regiment, a Foreign Military Training Unit, and a Marine Special Operations Support Group. There are 3-4 Special Operations companies in each battalion. The marines basically lost two of their four Force Recon companies (one of them a reserve unit) in order to build MARSOC. Meanwhile, more troops have been added to division level reconnaissance units, to take up some of that slack. The Special Operations companies (with about 120 personnel each) can provide Force Recon capabilities to marine units they are attached to. The two Special Operations Battalions provide a combination of services roughly equal to what the U.S. Army Special Forces and Rangers do, as well as some of the functions of the Force Recon units. Eventually, there are to be nine companies in the two Special Operations Battalion.
All the other services, except the marines, contributed to the formation of SOCOM (Special Operations Command) in the late 1980s. The marines finally got around to working with SOCOM in 2005, when it was agreed that they would create a marine special operations command (MARSOC). The Marine Corps had long resisted such a step, largely because of its belief that marines are inherently superior warriors, capable of highly specialized missions. This attitude began to change during the fighting in Afghanistan, when marines were assigned to support SOCOM troops there.
As a result of that experience, marines were attached to SOCOM for liaison and observation purposes. In 2004, the marines organized a company sized unit of commandos, “Detachment One”, using volunteers from their Force Recon troops, the closest thing the marines had to commandos. Detachment One was sent to Iraq, where it’s performance convinced SOCOM that marines could operate at the SOCOM level.
The marines see their future as a smaller (by a up to a third, or more), even more elite, force, and better equipped force. The marines want to get back to sea, and the reduction in force (RIF) can be done without losing a lot of the valuable combat experience the marines have gained in the last nine years. Recruiting will be reduced for a few years, and some marines can transfer to the navy (in jobs that both sailors and marines handle), especially the NECC force. Marines have long moved over to the army, and the army would be glad to get an infusion of combat experienced marines, especially NCOs and officers. The marines may also expand their reserve force, and marines who decide to get out, can simply move over to the reserves.
The marines who remain with the Corps will probably continue the more extensive training marines have been getting for several decades now. This makes the marines an even more elite force, which is what many marines are fine with.

Complementando: acho mesmo que o CFN deveria deixar de fazer parte da Marinha, e ganhar autonomia operacional e administrativa.

Sds.

PS: também acho que do ponto de vista operacional o USMC hoje se tornou mais um “segundo exército” que qualquer outra coisa. O que eu desconfio que não é de todo bom.

Marine, muito obrigado por ter lido o material que enviei.

Bacchi

Marine em meu pouco tempo aqui no Blog, estou me tornando seu fã. Sempre com esclarecimentos embasados e muito elucidativos.

O Vader foi cirúrgico nas palavras. A marinha gastou horrores e o que sobrou hoje de equipamentos.